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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature 0f the Case.

A.

Plaintiffs/Appellants, Jefri

and Debbie Davis (hereinafter referred

hired Defendants/Respondents, Charles John

McCanlies (Tuma’s broker)

Donald

J.

worked

directly with the Davises

the

documents prior

title

Tuma (hereinafter referred t0

as

home

in

t0 assist

them

in purchasing a

and when they found a home they

t0 closing.

t0 as “the Davises”)

liked,

“Tuma”) and

Tuma

North Idaho.

he alone investigated

Tuma failed t0 notice that the road that both he and the

Davises believed provided access t0 the

home

did not in fact d0 so.

The Davises ﬁled

suit

against Defendants/Respondents alleging fraud, constructive fraud, and negligence.

Facts.1

B.

In 2009, the Davises, resided in Dublin, California. (R. V01.

them

home

0f 2009, they hired a broker to

assist

worked

them With the purchase 0f their

for the broker, assisted

364, ﬂ 2

-

in

p.

250, ﬂ

heart issues and

it

Tuma was

suffers

current

home.

informed 0f this

for her to

fact.

have a smooth, gently sloped access

(R. V01.

1, p.

I,

p.

363-

to her

on the home, Tuma provided the Davises with a Video of the property

Gray Wolf Road.

18).

(R. V01.

Wolf Road based on his

District

and

200).

things, that the access to the property

I,

p.

201,

11

Tuma believed the property had

investigation of the property. (R. V01.

Court agreed that some 0f the facts in

admissible but failed t0 clarify which ones. (R. V01

knowledge.

(R. V01.

sclerosis, seizers

which he showed them, amongst other

The

In September

North Idaho and Tuma, who

from Crohns and Celiac disease, multiple

was very important

Prior to closing

1

2).

3).

Debbie Davis

home.

in purchasing a

I,

Plaintiffs’
1,

366).

Afﬁdavits on

The

I,

p. 85,

1]

was provided Via
access Via

Gray

17).

Summary Judgment were

facts alleged here are all

in

not

based 0n personal

Tuma was provided With a Preliminary Title Report and a copy of

Also prior to closing,

“CC&RS) which

the Covenant, Conditions and Restrictions (hereinafter referred t0 as

encumbered the Davis’s home and various surveys 0f the property Which were attached

CC&Rs.

(R. V01.

I,

p. 85,

11

18

-

Tuma did not provide

19).

the Davises prior t0 closing. (R. V01.

documents, (R. V01.

I,

p. 86,

11

22).

is

not from Grey

Tuma

access the

Instead,

Tuma himself examined these

11

16).

prior to closing

Wolf Road but from

home 0n October

1“,

shows

More than two months
employee who subject

line

I,

p.

m

he readily admits. (R. V01.

2009, (R. V01.

I,

p.

364,

11

0n

relied exclusively

1.,

p.

200-201,

1]

16).

another point off 0f the highway. (R. V01.

4),

I,

p. 86,

1]

24).

I,

p. 86,

1T

The Davises

and utilized Gray Wolf Road
that they did not

t0

have legal

25 1, ﬂ 3)
closing, the Davises received

only read “record 0f survey”. (R. V01,

the following attachment. (R. V01.

contained no

that the access t0 the Davis’s

home until August 0f 2016 when they were made aware

access over that road. (R. V01.

CC&Rs

The DaVises

the access t0 their property. (R. V01.

failed to notice this fact as

closed 0n the

15).

1]

200,

1, p.

The information Tuma reviewed

home

200,

a copy of any 0f this information to

22) and reassured the Davises that the

material adverse information. (R. V01.

Tuma’s assurances regarding

p.

I,

t0 the

I,

p. 86,

1]

28).

an e-mail from a
1,

title

company

p 112) The e-mail contained

,4-
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A careful review of the survey reveals that an easement upon which Gray Wolf Road sits

m

terminates at the far side of the neighbor’s lot and does not reach the Davises’
identify the easement as

recall seeing the e-mail, (R. V01.

it

and did not know

attachment but

know what

it

it

Gray Wolf Road.
I,

p.

why it was being

(R. V01.

was

sent. (R. V01.

could be about. (R. Vol.

0n

May

10th,

I,

p. 228,

I,

p. 229,

1]

11

1,

p. 14-17,

Terah attempted to open the

22).

it

again because she did not

24).

Wolf Road by their neighbor in 2016,

2018. The Davises sued

fraud and constructive fraud. (R. Vol.

summary judgment 0n

Debbie Davis did not

p. 114).

crashed her computer and she did not try t0 open

instituted

The survey

202, ﬂ 23) but her daughter, Terah Davis, did recall seeing

After the Davises were denied the use 0f Gray
action

I,

lot.

1]

87

-1

this

Tuma and his broker for negligence,

1 1).

The Defendants moved

the grounds that the statutes 0f limitations

on

all

expired because the DaVises causes of action accrued in October 2009

for

of Davises’ claims had

When they purchased the

property because they had constructive notice 0f the access issue or in

December 2009 when

the

record of survey was provided to them.

The
against

District

Court ruled that the Davises had constructive knowledge of their claim

Tuma in October of 2009 when they closed based on the

0f Idaho Code

§ 55-81

1.

(R. V01.

I,

p.

constructive notice provisions

368-369). In addition, the District Court held that the

Davises had inferred actual knowledge of their claim against

Tuma because

due diligence, and reviewed the attachment

was

closing, they

would have noticed their claim against Tuma.

The Davises moved
statutory

t0 the e-mail that

and contractual

t0

sent t0

(R. V01.

I,

p.

The

District

the Davises already plead causes 0f action

(R. V01.

1,

after

369-370).
for breach of

Court denied that motion based on

were time barred.

had exercised

them two months

amend their complaint t0 add causes 0f action

duties.

if they

P

373).

its

ﬁndings that

Did the

District

ON APPEAL

ISSUES

II.

Court commit an error When

it

determined that the Davises could not

amend their Complaint because the originally plead causes of action (as opposed t0
new causes of action) were barred by the Statute 0f Limitations?

the

proposed

Did the

District Court

notice that

commit

error

Gray Wolf Road was

When

it

determined that the DaVises had constructive

not the deeded access t0 their property because a

recorded survey showed that fact?

Did the

commit error when it decided 0n summary judgment the Davises
due diligence and therefor had inferred actual knowledge that Gray

District Court

failed to exercise

Wolf Road was

not the deeded access t0 their

Did the District court commit
were time barred?

error

when

it

Are the Davises entitled t0 attorney’s fees
Representation Agreement authorizes it?

home?

decided that the DaVises’ negligence claims

as costs

0n appeal because the Broker

ARGUMENT

III.

District Court Errored When It Determined that the Davises Could not Amend
Their Complaint because Their Originally Plead Causes 0f Action were Barred by

The

A.

the Statute 0f Limitations.

The

District

Court ruled the Davises could not amend their Complaint because the claims

in Davis’s original Complaint, as

barred. (R. V01.

I,

was an

373). This

to the

proposed

Amended

Complaint, were time

error because the District Court should

were time barred

the proposed additional claims

amendment was

opposed

in order t0 determine if the

have evaluated

if

proposed

futile.

A District Court’s decision t0 allow an amendment t0 the pleadings is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc.

v.

J.R. Simplot

Ca, 164 Idaho 669, 675, 434

P.3d 1275, 1281 (2019). Leave t0 amend pleadings should be freely granted unless certain
circumstances are present, one of which

PHHMorz‘g.

v.

discretion to

deny the Motion

to

Inc.

Amend if the proposed additional

v.

not an abuse 0f

claims are time barred. Black

Idaho First Nat. Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900,

t0

amend their Complaint

and for Violations of the duties owed by a

on the grounds
-

It is

(1 99 1 ).

The Davises moved

12

proposed additional claims are time barred.

Nickerson, 160 Idaho 388, 396, 374 P.3d 551, 559 (2016).

Canyon Racquetball Club,
904

is if the

13).

The

that the

District

realtor t0 a client. (R. V01.

Court denied the Motion to

additional statutory 0r contractual claims

futile.

I,

breach of contract

p. 272).

proposed additional claims were time barred. (R. V01.

Amend because the

Complaint were time barred or not recognized and

amendment

to include a claim for

failed t0 analyze

I,

Tuma objected
p. 329,

11

a.,

claims in the original

Whether the proposed

were time barred, thus rendering the proposed

L.

It

was an abuse of discretion

add new Claims based on the

remand

this

for the District Court to

fact that their existing Claims

deny Davis’s Motion

to

Amend t0

were time barred. This Court should

matter With instructions to determine if the DaVises proposed additional causes of

action are time barred.

Idaho Code § 55-811 is not a Shield from a Claim Related
0f the Contents 0f Recorded Documents.

B.

Standard Review.

i.

This matter was dismissed 0n
the District Court

proper
party

if the

is

t0 the Misrepresentation

When reviewing

moving party shows

entitled to

judgment

summary judgment. This Court uses

rulings

the

same standard

0n summary judgment and summary judgment

that there are

n0 disputes

as a matter of law.

as t0

any material

Greenwald v. W.

fact

and

is

as

only

that the

Sur. C0., 164 Idaho 929,

436

P.3d 1278, 1286 (2019).

Whether a claim
a question of fact.

(1992).

The

is

barred by the Statute 0f Limitations can be either a question 0f law 0r

Kawai Farms,

interpretation

Inc.

v.

Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614, 826 P.2d 1322, 1326

and construction 0f a

Court exercises free review. Valiant Idaho,

statute is a question

LLC v.

0f law over Which

this

JVL.L.C., 164 Idaho 280, 429 P.3d 168, 177

(20 1 8).

Since the District Court interpreted Idaho Code § 55-811 in such a
the Davises’ Statute of Limitations

commenced running

in 2009, this

way t0 conclude that

Court freely reviews that

conclusion.

Idaho Code 55-811 Cannot be Used

ii.

t0 Shield a

Person from a Claim of

Misrepresentation.

The crux 0f this appeal

commence
claims.

is

When the Davises had knowledge 0f their claim

sufﬁcient t0

the running 0f the statute of limitations for fraud, constructive fraud and negligence

The

District

Court ruled that the Davises had constructive knowledge of the fact that the
7

deeded access t0

their

home was

Wolf Road when

not Gray

they closed on the

Idaho Code § 55-811 imputed constructive knowledge. (R. V01.

1,

369). This

home based 0n
was an

error

because that statute cannot be used to shield a person from a claim of misrepresentation
pertaining t0 recorded documents.

A cause of action for fraud must be brought Within three years.
cause of action for fraud does not
constituting the fraud.

Doe

v.

commence

Idaho Code 5-218(4).

A

until the aggrieved party discovers the facts

Boy Scouts ofAmerical 159 Idaho

103, 106, 356 P.3d 1049, 1052

(20 1 5).

Idaho Code § 55-811 provides that

if a

purchaser of real property

recorded documents before ﬁnalizing the transaction, the purchaser
constructive

knowledge 0f contents 0f recorded documents. Large

deemed

is

v.

fails to

t0

search the

have

Caﬁ’erly Really, Ina, 123

Idaho 676, 680, 851 P.2d 972, 976 (1993). The statute imports constructive knowledge to a
purchaser for the sole purpose 0f protecting third party’s holding prior recorded interest in real
property from lawsuit. “The purpose and effect of LC. § 55—811
a recorded claim or lien 0n the property from claims
the property after the interest

is

recorded.” Large

v.

is

t0 protect persons With

by other persons who acquire an

interest in

Caﬂerty Really, Ina, 123 Idaho 676, 680,

851 P.2d 972, 976 (1993).

As

far

back as 1905, the Idaho Supreme Court has held

provisions 0f Idaho

Code §55-811 d0 not

shield a person

that the constructive notice

from a claim

misrepresentations of the contents of recorded documents.

for fraud based

Eastwood v. Standard Mines

Milling C0., 11 Idaho 195, 81 P. 382, 383 (1905). The doctrine

is

based on principles 0f

equitable estoppel.

A public record is an available means 0f information as t0
questions 0f title, and one

claim estoppel against one

who does not take advantage of it
who merely fails t0 furnish such
8

on

cannot

&

Which the representation,
by actively misleading the person setting up the estoppel and
preventing him from having recourse to available means 0f
information, has been held t0 excuse his failure to inform himself
information. There are, however, cases in

of the

facts,

even

in the case

0f constructive notice by matter of

record.

And more recently and more

directly

on point

is

Large

v.

Caﬂerty Really, Ina, 123 Idaho

676, 851 P.2d 972 (1993).

55—81

however, is not meant t0 be a shield against fraud
and misrepresentation. Large is not claiming a right in the
I.C. §

1,

property adverse t0 the recorded restrictive covenants. Rather,

Large claims he was induced t0 purchase the property based 0n the
misrepresentations 0f Cafferty and Diversiﬁed in failing t0 disclose
the existence 0f the restrictive covenants.

1d

at

123 Idaho 676, 680, 851

P.2d 972, 976 (1993).
In this case, the Davises did not allege that

Tuma has

own. They alleged they were induced into purchasing

an unrecorded

their

misrepresentations regarding access t0 their home. (R. V01.

interest adverse t0 their

home based 0n Tuma’s
1,

p

13).

Idaho Code §55-811 only

imparts constructive notice 0f adverse, recorded, interest t0 a prospective buyer t0 protect
holders of prior recorded interests and has no application to claim that your relator mislead you.

This Court should reverse and remand this matter with instruction t0 reinstate the Davises
claims for fraud, constructive fraud and negligence.

C.

Whether 0r not a person exercised due diligence is a question of fact that should not
have been resolved 0n summary judgment since the facts 0f this case could lead t0
the conclusion that the Davises had no reason t0 make further attempts t0 open an
e-mail that was sent t0 them two months after closing.
i.

Standard 0f Review.

Whether a claim

is

barred by the Statute of Limitations can be either a question of

law 0r a question 0f fact. Kawai Farms,

Inc.

v.

Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 614, 826 P.2d

1322, 1326 (1992). The District Court ruled that the Davises statute 0f limitations began
to run in

December 0f 2009 because they would have discovered

The Court 0f Appeals has held

problem

them two months

exercised due diligence and opened the e-mail sent to

Whether 0r not a person has exercised due diligence

the

is

if they

had

after closing.

generally a question of fact.

that “[0]rdinarily,

what

constitutes

[the exercise of] reasonable diligence t0 discover fraud so as t0

affect the time

When the

question of fact

of limitations begins to run
for the jury....Of course, where only one
statute

is

a

conclusion can be drawn from the evidence, the question of
reasonable diligence t0 discover fraud
as a matter 0f law.”

may be

decided by the court

Kawai Farms,

Inc.

v.

Longstreet,

121 Idaho 610, 614, 826 P.2d
1322, 1326 (1992) citing Full
Circle, Inc.

v.

Schelling, 108

Idaho 634, 638, 701 P.2d 254,
258.
is reﬁned t0: Whether more than one conclusion
whether Kawai exercised due diligence could be drawn from

Thus, the question
as t0

the evidence in this case.
Id.

A Reasonable Person Could Conclude That it was Reasonable for the Davises

ii.

Make no Further Attempts
After They Had Closed.
t0

The

District

to

Open an E-mail Sent t0 Them Two Months

Court ruled that the Davises could have discovered the access issue had they

exercised proper due diligence and therefor had inferred actual knowledge that Gray

was not

their

deeded access. The

failed to take further steps t0

occurred. (R. V01.

1, p.

District

Court reached

download a survey

370). This

is

sent to

an error because

which a reasonable person could conclude

this

completed two months

conclusion because the Davises had

them two months

facts existed

after closing

earlier.

10

t0

had

on summary judgment from

that the Davises did exercise proper

when they did not open an attachment that had something

Wolf Road

due diligence

d0 With a transaction they had

“Actual knowledge 0f the fraud can be inferred

if the

aggrieved party could have

discovered the fraud by reasonable diligence, although the Court Will hesitate to infer such

knowledge. Nerco Minerals C0.

900 (2004)

citing

v.

Morrison Knudsen Corp, 140 Idaho 144, 150, 9O P.3d 894,

DBSA/TRI V/ Bender,

130 Idaho 796, 807, 948 P.2d 151, 162(1997).

hold that a reasonable ﬁnder 0f fact could conclude that a layperson

“We

may justiﬁably rely 0f

multiple assurances from a realtor as to the zoning status of property. Thus, because there

is

a

genuine issue of material fact as t0 Whether Path justiﬁably relied on Long's representations, the
District

Court erred in dismissing Path's fraud claim.” Path

t0 Health,

LLP v.

Long, 161 Idaho

50, 59, 383 P.3d 1220, 1229 (2016).

The

District

Court ruled that With the exercise 0f proper due diligence, the Davises would

have discovered the problem With their access in December 2009. The District Court did not,
however, explain

why the

facts

0f this case could only lead to the conclusion that the Davises did

not conduct proper due diligence in 2009. The facts 0n

summary judgment could

the conclusion that the Davises did act With due diligence

when they were

easily lead to

sent the survey of the

property two months after the purchase of their home.

No dispute
access to their

that

it

of fact exists that the Davises relied upon Tuma’s representation that the

home was provided by Gray Wolf Road.

was not unreasonable

contents

more than two months

subject line just indicates

it

for

fail to

it is

A reasonable fact ﬁnder could conclude

open an attachment from a

after

title

company and examine

you had purchased your property. More s0

a “record 0f survey”

your personal records anytime you

— meaning

that

it is

its

the e-mail

of record and you can get

like.

Furthermore, a reasonable person could conclude that a lay person would not be able t0

100k

at

a survey and ﬁgure out that they did not have access on Gray

Wolf Road. Even

if the

Davises had noticed that the road shown 0n the survey did not extend t0 their home, such would
11

not necessarily lead a lay person t0 believe that they could not use the road that existed

When

they bought the property.

It is

undisputed that the Davises relied entirely upon

Tuma

pertaining t0 the access t0 the property and they were assured

as regards to

by him n0

any information

issues existed.

It

was a

question of fact as to Whether they should have in the exercise of proper due diligence, opened
that e-mail that

was

them and whether they would have even noticed

sent to

the issue With the

summary judgment was not proper.

access if they had. In light of these questions of fact,

This Court should reverse the ﬁnding 0f the District Court that the DaVises failed t0
exercise due diligence and

D.

remand

the matter for further proceedings.

The Davis’s Negligence Claims are not Time Barred because They were not 0n
Constructive Notice 0f the Problem with Their Access When They purchased the
Home in 2009 or Actual Notice Two Months Later.
The

District

Court dismissed the Davis’s negligence claims based on a ﬁnding that they

were 0n constructive notice of the record 0f survey
the Statute 0f Limitations

commenced on

section B(ii) and C(ii) above,

E.

which

in

October 0f 2009. (R. V01.

that day. This

are incorporated

was an

1, p.

371) and

error for the reasons set forth in

by reference

here.

The Davises are Entitled t0 Attorney’s Fees and Costs 0n Appeal because the
Broker Representation Agreement Authorizes it.
Attorney’s fees and costs

may be awarded t0 the prevailing party on appeal

for in a contract or statute. I.R.C.P. § 54(6). Kesting

v.

if provided

Kesting, 160 Idaho 214, 220, 370 P.3d

729, 735 (2016).

The Broker Representation Agreement

in this case provides for

an award 0f attorney’s

fees to the prevailing party.

...relative t0

such

suit 0r proceeding.

Venue 0f any

action arising

out 0f this Agreement shall be in the Court of the county in Which

Broker’s ofﬁce

is

located. (R. V01.

12

1,

p 110,

11

12).

As

set forth above, this matter

should not have been decided 0n

summary judgment and

it

should be remanded. If this Court agrees, then the DaVises Will be the prevailing party 0n appeal

and are

entitled t0 their reasonable attorney’s fees as costs.
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CONCLUSION

IV.

undisputed that the DaVises relied entirely upon Tuma’s representations that access

It is

to their

home was provided by Gray Wolf Road and that Tuma misrepresented that

Davises.

Tuma

cannot use the constructive notice provisions of Idaho Code

himself from a claim 0f fraud because that statute

is

§

fact to the

55-811 to shield

not designed to shield a person from a claim

of fraud, but t0 protect subsequent purchasers from unrecorded third-party claims against the
property.

It

knowledge

was an

error for the District Court t0 conclude that the DaVises

that they did not

In addition,

it

have the right t0 use Gray Wolf Road.

was a question of fact whether the Davises should have,

due diligence, open the e-mail
District

had constructive

that

was

sent t0

them

in

December 0f 2009.

It

in the exercise

was an

of

error for the

Court t0 conclude on summary judgment that the DaVises had failed to exercise due

diligence and therefor

had inferred

actual

knowledge

that they did not

have the right t0 use Gray

Wolf Road.
This Court should reinstate the DaVises claims and remand this matter to the District

Court for further proceedings.

DATED this

12th

day of June, 2019

ﬂ

ARTHUR M. BISTLINE
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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